


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**Terror vs. Terror: Effects of Military
Retaliation on Terrorism**

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- Biography -

Lieutenant Colonel Brittain Mallow is a U.S. Army Officer with twenty years' experience in the Military Police Branch, and as a Middle East Area Specialist. His assignments have included: Commander of a Military Police Battalion under the United Nations in Haiti, senior Antiterrorist Staff Officer for the United States Army in Europe during DESERT STORM, two tours in the Middle East, and numerous other operational and staff positions. LTC Mallow holds a BS in Sociology from Virginia Tech, and a MA in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. At the time this article was written, LTC Mallow was a student at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

- ABSTRACT -

Terrorism is a continuing and disturbing threat. Some consider military retaliation an appropriate response with deterrent value against terrorists and supporters. Terrorism itself as a tactic uses violence to communicate with and influence audiences for political purpose. It is a form of psychological warfare that goes beyond acceptable norms for the use of force in international relations. The choice of the terror tactic involves both conscious and unconscious motivations; it can satisfy both the strategic and psychological needs of its perpetrators. Furthermore, the psychological motivations of terrorists, their values, and their desire to flaunt conventional logic place them on a different level of rationality from nonterrorists.

Like terrorism, retaliation is a form of communication through violence. It can affect multiple audiences for many purposes: bolstering public opinion, destroying/disrupting terrorist infrastructure, and potentially deterring the choice of the terrorist tactic. Symmetry, proportionality, and discrimination in the targeting of retaliation all vary its effects on audiences. To deter terrorists and their supporters, retaliation must meet the requirements of deterrence theory: credibility, shared interest, and rationality.

Examples of retaliation for terrorism indicate there are significant problems with its effectiveness as a deterrent. Its viability is diminished by the transience and fragility of credibility, the moral and legal "baggage" of retaliation itself, and the differences in values and interests between terrorists/supporters and retaliating states. Retaliation also presents substantial risks beyond its failure to deter. Force protection, dangers of escalatory violence, and risks of condemnation by the world community accompany the use of retaliation. These risks, combined with its questionable viability as a deterrent, make retaliation a difficult policy choice.

Terrorism is everyone's favorite enemy. Legitimate governments say they want to eliminate this phenomenon, to remove this blight from the international and domestic arenas. But most agree it is not going away. High profile incidents involving the United States, the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing in April, 1995, and the bombings of U.S. military buildings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in November, 1995, and Khobar in June, 1996 have focused policy makers' attention anew on what can be done to combat terrorism. The reality of the post-Cold War period is that the United States can expect continued, if not increased targeting of American interests, largely a result of insurgencies, primordial and interstate conflicts freed from the boundaries of dual-superpower rivalry.¹ The search for a coherent and effective strategy against terrorism goes on.

A war on terrorism. Is terrorism a new wave of warfare? Time and again, the United States and other nations have "declared war" on terrorism. If we are truly at war against terrorism, many say, why not use the best military in the world to fight it? Why should we not strike swiftly and mercilessly to punish terrorists, and in the process make other potential aggressors pause to consider the costs of taking on the United States?

"Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it."

Secretary of State George Shultz, 1984

In a speech in September, 1996, CIA Director John Deutch echoed this sentiment, saying that his organization was drawing up a list of military options to "...act against terrorist groups directly either to prevent them from carrying out operations or to retaliate against groups we know are responsible for operations. There will be no guaranteed safe havens anywhere in the world."²

Terrorism seems to be a pervasive threat to U.S. interests worldwide. The use of force is an established and proven means for nations to exercise national power in pursuit of their interests. Furthermore, force is a fungible instrument -- that is, it can be used across a variety of policy domains, for a multitude of purposes, and with demonstrable effect.³ If force then can rightfully and effectively answer the violence of terrorism, argue many, the strength of a superpower can be brought to bear on one of the world's foremost problems. The question for discussion here is not the rightful use of force, but rather its effectiveness. Can the use of force, specifically military retaliation, serve as an effective deterrent to terrorism? The following will address some of the key aspects of this question: terrorism in general, terrorists and their motivations, and retaliation as a means of response, assessing its potential deterrent value.

DEFINING TERRORISM

Definitions are as contentious as terrorism itself, imbued as they are with the values and norms of their authors. Most definitions however, include common elements: violence combined with its psychological effects, political purpose, and a paradigm whereby the perpetrators and the immediate recipients of the violence are not the only parties affected. In addition, terrorism involves some degree of indiscriminateness and a preference for noncombatant victims.⁴

Terrorism is considered an illegitimate use of force, at least as defined by established states, who claim not to practice it. Whether one agrees or disagrees with this characterization, terrorism is clearly an abnormal instrument, beyond the acceptable norms for force.⁵ Terrorism is abnormal in two ways. First, it is often practiced by non-state actors, in a system where states have a legitimate monopoly on the use of force; and second, even in "state terror" -- terrorism by established governments -- it is a tactic whereby violence is knowingly directed against ordinary

people, not soldiers.

Is terrorism warfare? Violence directed from one nation at another has long been considered warfare. Terrorism may be directed by a nation or it may be supported by one. But much conflict at lower levels is also commonly considered warfare -- civil wars, insurgencies, and guerilla wars. Terrorism works as other forms of warfare, applying violence for political effect. A number of theorists place terrorism within the spectrum of conflict, on a continuum of violence which has at its extreme full-scale war. Terrorism combines counter-value attack (inflicting damage on an enemy without engaging his military directly), and an element of guerilla strategy whereby no definite lines are defended. If it is warfare, terrorism is clearly a type of psychological war aimed at a society, using violence for perceptual effect.⁶

Not all agree that terrorism is war. Part of the great debate on terrorism's definitions involves the moral dimension of how, and for what purpose terrorist violence is used. There are several views. Some argue that classic definitions of terrorism includes any entity which uses fear as a coercive tool. In this view, all violence and threats are terrorism. By this standard criminal justice, and even tax collection by a government are terrorism.⁷ The opposite perspective is that terrorism, largely because of its intentional indiscriminate violence toward noncombatants, and lack of restraint, is clearly distinguishable from warfare.⁸

The political agenda of terrorism distinguishes it from other forms of violence such as basic criminality and force used for legitimate law enforcement. Unlike in classical interstate war, the terrorist's aims are not always the total subjugation of their enemy, but rather a change in the political system or circumstances. But wars can be fought for less than unconditional surrender,

and even states who subscribe to the conventions of warfare violate their intent. Even if one argues that terrorists' goals are not as broad as in war, it is clear that this use of violence is an instrument -- a tactic or method of affecting some political end. Terrorism is neither a new phenomenon, nor a monolithic threat. It is purposeful violence, used by individuals, groups and governments for many different purposes.⁹ Terrorism as a strategy can be a sole policy, or may be incorporated into a larger array of tactics within a campaign, all for a particular end.¹⁰ Eliminating terrorism means eliminating the use of this tactic. Since other countries are involved with terrorists on multiple levels ranging from inaction to toleration, support, or outright sponsorship, we want to influence them as well.

Eliminating the tactic. The objective then is to eliminate terrorism as a viable tactic, to deter all from employing or supporting this method of violence. Because of legal limitations on the use of the U.S. military in domestic law enforcement,¹¹ we will focus here on international or transnational terrorism, specifically cases where a terrorist threat originates in another country. This paper will examine two basic questions: will retaliation work to deter terrorism; and is retaliation an appropriate choice, given its risks? We must first examine the basis for the choice of terrorism as a tactic, and look at the people who choose it.

THE BASIS FOR TERRORISM

Terrorism illustrates Liddell-Hart's "indirect approach" in warfare,¹² epitomizing the war principle "Economy of Force", whereby maximum effect is extracted from minimal effort.¹³ It can be viewed as a stratagem within basic military theory -- the use of trickery and cunning to gain psychological advantage and to neutralize part of an opponent's strength, economize effort, and maintain/restore one's own morale.¹⁴

Communication. Success of the terrorist tactic depends on communication, a key element of psychological warfare. The "terrorist -- victim -- audience" paradigm¹⁵ is dependent upon the linkage between its components. Those links are violence and communication. Violence links the terrorist to his victim, and serves as a form of communication to the broader audience. The communication process may be further facilitated by information media. The concepts of audience and communication are critical to terrorism, and are important also in evaluating the effects of response options.

Who chooses terrorism? Terrorism is often cited as the chosen tactic of the weak,¹⁶ but for certain it is an available tactic for all. It has been used by states and non-states, groups large and small, superpowers and Third-World countries. Surrogates using terrorist tactics were a popular choice in the Cold War, both to further ideology and to increase costs for an opponent without risking direct confrontation and nuclear war. Clearly though, the terrorist tactic is on a smaller list of available tools for those who cannot take on more powerful enemies face-to-face. The tactic has been particularly attractive for revolutionary organizations opposing incumbent governments.¹⁷

What, then motivates the terrorists themselves -- why do they choose this tactic, and what can that tell us about effective response? Part of the answer is in the "abnormality" of terrorism. This is a tactic of rule-breaking, valued by some precisely because it violates moral, political, and legal rules. Terrorism is meant to demonstrate the illegitimacy of societal norms and standards of behavior, to shock, and to show deliberate disdain for the enemy, his authority and power.¹⁸

"Violence takes much deeper root in irregular warfare than it does in regular warfare. In the latter it is counteracted by obedience to constituted authority, whereas in the

former [irregular warfare] makes a virtue of defying authority and violating rules."¹⁹

Motivation for the choice of terrorist tactics exists at both conscious and unconscious levels. At the conscious level political aims and the objective decision to use violence represent a goal-oriented strategy. There is however, another level of motivation. Unconscious motives may include hatred, want for power, and psychological gratification.²⁰ Perhaps then there are aspects of personality that contribute to the decision to use this form of violence.

Psychological factors. There is no evidence to suggest a uniform terrorist psychology, but there appear to be common characteristics among terrorists: stimulus-seeking, action-oriented, and with a tendency to externalize problems.²¹ There may also be a tendency toward relatively weak self-image and identity which could predispose some individuals toward a need to become part of a group. The dynamics of the terrorist group become very important. The desire of individuals to "belong" may cause them to subordinate their own needs to the needs, objectives, and even the survival of the group itself. Youthful gang behavior also illustrates this dynamic, where individuals displace their own values -- such as those of parents-- and assume the values of the group. In cases like nationalist movements, the group may reinforce family values, but with gangs and terrorists the group values are quite different. With group identity comes strong pressure for conformity to group norms. The use of violence is a norm, and the danger and violence of terrorism reinforce the cohesion of the group. Ultimately, the maintenance of the group itself becomes the most important goal.²² As violence solidifies the group, it also helps define the group and its members.

An irrational choice? This is not to say that the choice of violence by terrorists is mindless. In

his work on causation of revolutionary violence, Ted Robert Gurr states, "Man's resort to political violence is in part unreasoning, but does not occur without reason."²³ To the terrorists themselves, this choice is neither unreasoning nor without reason. In the mind of the terrorist, the use of violence is rational. Because terrorists reject the norms of civil society, most of us view the choice of terrorism as irrational, or even insane-- clearly abnormal. Conversely, to the politically motivated, frustrated, and perhaps poorly-actualized, terrorist violence may seem not only the logical, but the only choice.

Terrorism may be a calculated response to circumstances, often following failures of other means. It is a preferred tactic in insurgent strategies, and for surrogate warfare by states that cannot face direct confrontations. Terrorism suits the desires of a small group for swift action, and may be facilitated by their target's vulnerability, or even by enabling technologies.²⁴ Nevertheless, as stated above, the psychology of the terrorists themselves contributes to the choice of tactic and underlies motivations to carry out the violence. Can the choices be affected? Can support for terrorism be eliminated?

RETALIATION

"It must be made clear to the master killers of Tehran and Tripoli that there can be no ultimate hiding place... that the arm of civilization is long and sinewy and may be stretched out to take them by the throat."²⁵

Military options to counter terrorism include preemption, rescue operations, retribution (selectively hunting down and executing terrorists), and retaliation/reprisal.²⁶ Reprisal is a legal term referring to an action taken by one state to penalize another for an illegal aggression. Military retaliation is an after-the-fact application of military force, similar in most ways to reprisal, but not limited to interstate action.

Retaliation is a reactive response, action taken following an incident and intended to answer it. While often couched in moralistic language as "punishment," retaliation is far more than an impartially-administered disciplinary action as that term would imply. It is a political act. It is also communication -- action carrying the retaliator's message to the terrorists and others. Like terrorism itself, retaliation has an immediate target (the terrorists, their base, or some other point of attack). It also has multiple intended audiences (remaining terrorists, terrorist supporters, other prospective terrorists, other states, and the retaliator's own public).

Purposes of retaliation. Retaliation may be contemplated to eliminate the specific terrorists themselves, to disrupt their plans and operations, or to increase costs for terrorists and their sponsors by destroying or damaging key infrastructure. Like terrorism, retaliation demonstrates power and resolve, builds constituencies, and degrades the enemy's support. Intended to influence others beyond its physical effects, it is meant to assuage public opinion in the retaliating state, to intimidate terrorists and their sponsors, and to deter enemies from choosing the terrorist tactic.

Targets, scope, and audiences. Choices of targets, and the scope of retaliation can reflect the full range of objectives, including the intent to influence audiences beyond the immediate victims. Where there are other states involved, the greatest choice is whether to target just the terrorists, or the sponsors/supporters (or both). If terrorism is a form of warfare, some argue, military response against states who use or support it is clearly appropriate. In 1984 the United States made a distinct move toward viewing terrorism as warfare. *National Security Decision Directive Number 138* (April 1984) contained the explicit threat of retaliation for terrorism, and

used the justification that this was within the nation's right to *defend itself*.²⁷ By citing the principle of self defense, the document implies that terrorism is a threat to the country against which all, including military instruments, are appropriate. It also indicates that if necessary, force will be used against not just terrorists, but countries that assist them. This also points out another similarity of retaliation to terrorism -- its fundamentally political basis. While terrorists seek changes in political power relationships or the political system, retaliation, along with other responses, is a mechanism for preserving the political status quo.²⁸ Choices of actual targets, and the scope of the retaliation are related to the purposes of the action. Key choices here are symmetry, proportionality, and discrimination. With each of these, a primary consideration is the effect on the audiences.

Symmetrical retaliation involves targets directly linked to the incident prompting the attack -- such as striking the specific base from which the original terrorist act was launched. An asymmetrical retaliatory strike would choose some other target which would hurt the terrorists or supporters -- such as an infrastructure target in a terrorist-supporting country. Symmetry is most important in linking the retaliation to the terrorist act in the eyes of the audiences.

Retaliation can be proportional or disproportional -- although there is a large degree of relativity here. It is harder to calibrate the size of a military raid, for example, to a nightclub bombing. An extreme example of a disproportional attack would be a nuclear strike, or carpet-bombing of an entire city. The choice of a proportional retaliatory response also plays to the audiences, such as where response is limited so as not to give greater legitimacy to the terrorists or their sponsors.

Discrimination refers to the degree of precision used in excluding nonterrorists from those attacked. Related to both symmetry and proportionality, discrimination is intended in part to demonstrate a key difference between the retaliation and the terrorism which provoked it. Since terrorism is characterized by its choice of noncombatant victims, and often by the relatively random selection of the individuals victimized, it carries a moral stigma. Limiting collateral damage is not simply economy of force, it communicates to the audiences that the retaliating nation discriminates between the responsible and the innocent. Asymmetric attacks may not demonstrate this as well, and disproportionate attacks are clearly less discriminate.

Military retaliation is a specific mission for which the military has been tasked to prepare.²⁹ Selection of this option depends on its viability (effectiveness) and its suitability (appropriateness). To discover if the threat of military retaliation is effective and appropriate to deter terrorists and supporters, we must examine the concept of deterrence

DETERRENCE

Deterrence is the psychological process of manipulating another's behavior by threatening him with harm.³⁰ It involves persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of action.

"Deterrence...is concerned with influencing the choices that another will make...by influencing his expectations of how we will behave...confronting him with evidence that our behavior will be determined by his behavior."³¹

This mechanism employs credible threats of force as a means of influencing a decision-maker. Successful deterrence involves the capability and the will to use force, and the communication of that credible threat to an adversary. Deterrence does not in itself necessarily include the actual application of force, but rather the threat of its application.

Credibility. Being able and willing to retaliate are important, but more critical is the communication of those facts to a potential adversary. While capability is relatively easy to measure, the assessment of commitment (or will) is less so, being a function of such varying factors as form of government, leader style and personality, public opinion and character, and geopolitical environment. Credibility is the perceived likelihood that a threat will be carried out, achieved as one party communicates that he has the capability and commitment to act.³² That message may come from prior history, evidence of current preparations, and outright statements. Credibility is entirely in the mind of an opponent.

Shared interest. Deterrence depends on a perception that both parties share some form of common interest, that there may be a mutually-advantageous outcome. It is an interaction that contains both conflict and cooperation, a situation where both parties can gain, not only at the other's expense. In the case of deterring terrorists the shared interest may simply be the desire to avoid direct conflict.³³

Rationality. Another critical component in deterrence is rationality. Rational behavior is a calculating, value-maximizing strategy of decision, in which individuals decide between alternatives based on self-interest. All deterrent theory rests on the assumption that the parties are rational decision-makers.³⁴ Deterrent theorists differ on how this rationality works in a deterrent situation. The elements of fear, cost-benefit analysis, and uncertainty are all involved in the process.³⁵ For deterrence to be practical though, one's opponent must be rational, or at least predictable.

Measuring deterrence success. Proponents argue that deterrence helped us avoid nuclear war

throughout the last 45 years -- and perhaps it did. The basic problem is that one never knows exactly when deterrence works. Conventional, or non-nuclear deterrence certainly has its skeptics. In studies on crisis, numerous scholars have found little correlation to support that deterrence works to prevent conflict in general.³⁶ Others have found that considering some of the key considerations of credibility, shared interest, and rationality, it is possible to demonstrate cases where deterrence has in fact succeeded.

Arab-Israeli conventional deterrence. In an examination of the Arab-Israeli conflict over the period 1948-1977, Elli Lieberman concluded that Arab countries were successfully deterred from attacking Israel. In his view, in spite of continuing animosity, Egypt in particular, was deterred by Israel's credible threat. He goes on to conclude that the demonstration of resolve or will over a prolonged period is indispensable to the credibility of a deterrent threat. To crystalize this credibility, however, the defender must sometimes go to extraordinary lengths, including war, to demonstrate resolve.³⁷

Deterrence then, is a psychological mechanism, and a communicative process that involves the transmission of a retaliatory threat. It is a theory which rests upon the key assumptions and considerations of capability, commitment, credibility, shared interest, and rationality. Finally, the success of deterrent strategy is difficult to prove.

RETALIATING TO DETER TERRORISM

Having examined terrorism, retaliation, and deterrence in general, we can now look at the effects of retaliation on terrorism. As we have seen, retaliation shares with terrorism a common aspect of communication with various audiences. The greatest question is whether or not the

"message" of retaliation can reach and affect those audiences to dissuade them from the choice of this tactic of violence.

To deter terrorism retaliation must meet the requirements of deterrence. First of all, actions to deter terrorism must communicate the credibility of the retaliating state's power, regardless of whatever other purposes they serve. Communication must be directed toward, and must affect the decision making of the terrorist leaders and their supporters to deter them from this course.

Also required in deterrent theory is the recognition of common interest between parties involved. Between individuals, terrorist groups, involved states, and the defending nations, true shared interests may be minimal. Even if some of the parties recognize advantages of refraining from direct confrontation, others may not agree.

Rationality too is a problem. The different perspectives and values of those engaged in terrorism make it unlikely they will view things in the same way as established governments. Even sponsor/supporting state leaders may have markedly different ways of calculating cost and benefit. As deterrent theorist Patrick Morgan states, revolutionaries are less likely to be "sensible" leaders -- they despise existing authority, are predisposed to action and impatience, tend to be risk-takers, and frequently have embraced violence as the mechanism for change.³⁸

U.S. Strike on Libya The U.S. raid on Libya in 1986 provides a contemporary example of retaliation. The U.S. military strike on Tripoli and Benghazi on April 14, 1986 culminated a comprehensive campaign of coercive diplomacy and sanctions. In the context of the activities of Libyan-affiliated terrorism, this event represented a dramatic point in an escalatory cycle which had begun several years earlier.³⁹ In measuring the intent and effects of the action, it is

useful to look at each of the intended audiences for the retaliation.

With the declared policy of the Reagan administration, recent past antiterrorism failures, and the desire to solidify public resolve, this action clearly served a domestic agenda. In this regard the strike appeared quite successful -- in one survey 71% of U.S. respondents approved of the action.⁴⁰ The public disclosure of U.S. signals intelligence to demonstrate Libyan complicity in the Berlin LaBelle Discotheque bombing which killed several Americans, was a risky, but necessary step in this process to establish a linkage between the retaliation and the terrorism. This contributed to the domestic credibility of the action.

A second critical audience was the collection of European nations. The terrorist incidents of the early 1980's had largely occurred in Europe, including the bombing which precipitated the Libya raid. Western European nations did not, however, universally share the United States' enthusiasm for an aggressive anti-Libyan policy. Some attributed this apathy to Europe's economic links with Libya.⁴¹ In the period leading up to the raid, statements from the U.S. administration were aimed at the European audience, but went largely unanswered, except by Great Britain. While some argue that the effect was unintended, rather than a purpose of the action, there was a clear shift following the retaliation.⁴² In spite of some indignant but relatively weak condemnations of the use of force, Europeans generally changed their approach toward Libya. Almost all countries in Western Europe took additional defensive measures, as well as expelling numerous Libyan diplomats, and endorsing economic sanctions.⁴³ It seemed that retaliation brought home to the Europeans the dangers of terrorism -- whether in respect for the strong stance taken by the U.S. or in fear of further terrorist incidents originating in Libya.

Another set of audiences was of course the terrorists and their sponsors/supporters, in this case the Abu Nidal Organization and the Libyan government, along with other potential enemies.

The raid was designed to strike a Libyan commando training center, military barracks and airport facilities in Tripoli, and two military bases in Benghazi.⁴⁴ The only target where actual terrorists involved with the attacks in Europe might have been logically located was the training facility.

The message was aimed toward the sponsor rather than the terrorists -- an asymmetric attack. A demonstration of U.S. power and resolve, this was a message to both Libya and its clients that the use of terror would bear a price in lives and property. The attack was considered by U.S. officials to be a proportional response, considering the scope and range of alleged Libyan-sponsored terrorist incidents. This retaliation was also intended to be highly discriminate in its targeting, with minimal collateral damage and no noncombatant casualties. Results were mixed - one of the bombs fell off-target, landing in an apartment building near the French Embassy in Tripoli and reportedly killing some number of civilians. The careful planning that preceded this retaliation, and its measured and highly-discriminating targeting were all part of its carefully-crafted message. Many considered this action a resounding success. Terrorism, nonetheless, continued.⁴⁵

After the raid, Libyan leader Qaddafi appeared to take a more subdued role in direct sponsorship of terrorism. The downturn in Libyan-linked incidents in Europe immediately following the retaliation may be attributed more to the defensive and diplomatic measures taken by western nations than to deterrence. Heightened security probably did thwart some attacks, and the general attitudes of many nations coalesced around a tougher policy toward terrorists and sponsors.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, however, the events of the next three years, including multiple

terrorist incidents, marked dramatically by the bombing of the Pan American Flight 103 in December 1988, indicate that further escalatory violence was a result.⁴⁷ If Libya was in fact responsible for the Pan Am bombing, then, as Jeffrey Simon says,

"...the price the United States paid for the raid may have been the subsequent loss of 270 lives, including 187 Americans, as Qaddafi sought his revenge."⁴⁸

While retaliation against Libya may have enhanced the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, it appears that the requirements of shared interest and rationality were more problematic. Libyan leaders and the terrorists in this period do not seem to have shared the view of a common interest in permanently avoiding confrontation with the Americans. Their decision to continue the cycle of terrorist violence following the raid reflected a different value set -- a different rationality from that of Western leaders.

One may draw several conclusions from the Libyan retaliation example. First, the principle of multiple audiences here is obvious. The importance of the domestic political agenda also cannot be discounted. Most importantly, the effects of the retaliation on deterrence are unclear at best. While it is impossible to measure the number of other potential terrorist incidents that were avoided, the message of U.S. deterrent credibility was not wholly effective, even with its primary adversaries. The cycle of terrorist violence continued, and perhaps even escalated within three years. Retaliation did little to discourage the overall continued use of the terrorist tactic, and its effects on even those specifically targeted were short-lived.

Is Libya an isolated case? There do not seem to be many good examples of retaliation for transnational terrorism by which to evaluate deterrence effectiveness. Without conducting full case study analyses of numerous incidents of retaliation, the principles remain unproven.

However, similarities with other cases do exist. The following several examples, chosen to illustrate at least some degree of deterrent success, exhibit many of the same characteristics as the U.S. raid on Libya.

U.S. Army raids 1870-1889. The U.S. Army's campaigns against Native American tribes in the late 1800's included repeated retaliation for Indian terrorism. Army raids included attacks on Indian villages both in U.S. and Mexican territory. Raids into Mexico were intended not only to punish Indians for attacks on white settlers, but also to discourage Mexican support. The multiple audiences are again evident in this case: settlers, Indian tribes making attacks, other tribes, and the Mexican Government. U.S. military actions were in most cases symmetric, and usually proportional to the depredations that they were intended to counter. However, they were in many cases, not very discriminate in their targeting, killing scores of Indian women and children.⁴⁹

The U.S. retaliatory raids were a success, at least in the short term, apparently discouraging both Indian attacks and support, in some cases for up to a year.⁵⁰ The credible strength of the Army, the weakness of both the dispersed tribes and their sometime Mexican supporters all combined to give the U.S. a vast military and psychological advantage. At the same time, however, the ferocity of the Army's actions also worked to harden the position of those tribes that opposed the treaties. Indian attacks did not end until most tribes were effectively defeated and relocated to reservations.

Israeli retaliation into Jordan 1968-1970 Another apparently successful case was Israel's reprisal campaign for Palestinian terrorism during the period 1968-1970. In this case Israeli

raids were intended to punish PLO fedayeen guerrillas, to eliminate sanctuaries and support in adjacent Arab countries, and to assuage Israeli public opinion. After over a year of tit-for-tat violence, terror attacks by fedayeen and Israeli raids, including bombing of civilian areas, the Jordanians had had enough. The PLO presence in their country had precipitated a civil war which threatened the Jordanian regime itself. By 1970 Jordan curtailed sanctuary for PLO guerrillas and forced the Palestinian fighters out.⁵¹

Israeli credibility was never in question in this case. Jordan's King Hussein clearly understood his country's shared interest in avoiding further direct conflict, and decided that support for the PLO was not in his interest. The threat to the Jordanian regime's stability was perhaps more decisive than the threat of Israeli invasion. In fact, the Israeli retaliation into Jordan was a significant catalyst for the domestic instability. The asymmetric and disproportional nature of the Israeli response also posed a direct threat of escalation into war, but this was a risk the Israelis may have considered appropriate.

Israeli retaliatory strikes into Syria and Lebanon were less successful, however. Terrorist raids from South Lebanon and Golan continued to occur -- in the case of Syria with its government's support; in the case of Lebanon principally because of its government's inability to control it.⁵² Deterrence did not work against Syria, who faced no similar domestic threat, and whose overall strength relative to Israel was much greater. Failure to deter terrorist attacks from Lebanon was more a function of that state's weakness -- its inability to control its own territory.

Finally, the terrorists themselves were undeterred. The Palestine Liberation Organization moved out of Jordan, continued to operate from Syria and Lebanon, and continued its campaign

of terrorism. The Israeli retaliatory policy may have even strengthened and solidified the PLO's popular support. Thousands of young Arabs, perhaps later to man the cells of the Popular Front, the Abu Nidal group and Hizbollah, and to take on the struggle in the Intifada, were raised in the heritage of the earlier PLO confrontations with Israel. The long term effect of Israeli retaliatory policy has arguably been a seemingly never-ending upward spiral of escalatory violence, punctuated by conventional warfare. While the policy has worked to demonstrate credibility and resolve, and to reassure the domestic population that some action was being taken, it has come at high cost to Israel. The periodic disapproval of other nations for its aggressive stance notwithstanding, Israel has suffered more importantly from the continued violence of terrorism.⁵³

CONCLUSIONS

The proponents of an aggressive counterterrorist policy are many. The "war" on terrorism is a popular cause, and the rhetoric to press for victory is compelling.

"Force is a deterrent to terrorism. Nevertheless, the resort to force by a democratic society is always a difficult and usually reluctantly reached decision."⁵⁴

Deterrent theory suggests that for retaliation to be successful in preventing the choice of the terrorist tactic, it must contribute to the credibility of the threat posed by the retaliating state. In addition, the targeted decision makers, whether terrorists or supporters, must understand the message of retaliation, must perceive some benefit in heeding it, and must act in their own best interests. The positive and negative ramifications of retaliation as a deterrent strategy grow out of these requirements.

Credibility Retaliation can build credibility with both domestic and international audiences.

Government action against terrorists may bolster public morale, build popular support, and help

to counteract the fear engendered by terrorism. If retaliation is seen to physically eliminate terrorist capability by killing group members, destroying infrastructure, or disrupting their operations, then credibility is further enhanced. In this regard, symmetric, proportional, and highly discriminate attacks following swiftly after the original terrorist incident appear most effective.⁵⁵ To terrorists and their supporters, the retaliation demonstrates both capability and the will to use force.

Credibility though, is transient and fragile. To remain credible, a deterrent force must be demonstrated regularly, since any inconsistency in response may be perceived as weakness. As with conventional deterrence, one may have to go to war occasionally just to prove one has the will to do so. Furthermore, credibility with those other than the terrorists requires both a moral and a legal basis for action. There must be a clear link between the retaliation and its cause; the action must appear justified. Because the divulgence of sources and means may not always be prudent, it is often difficult to publicly justify retaliation morally and legally. Legal authority is also elusive in that almost all retaliations involve crossing sovereign borders. The legal status of "reprisal" can only be claimed in wartime, or under very restrictive circumstances.

Shared interest. Communicating to the terrorists or supporters the subtle message of shared interest seems hardly applicable in a discussion of military retaliation. Nonetheless, the perception must exist for there to be effective deterrence. Regular pronouncements of policy and diplomacy must emphasize how violence benefits no one. The difficulty is that terrorists and their supporters do not often agree with powerful status quo states on what is best, or even that conflict is to be avoided.

Rationality. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to deterrence of terrorism is the requirement for rationality. As previously stated, the act of terror is rational to the terrorist, but irrational to the nonterrorist. To deter, one must understand one's opponent -- but we do not see the world through the terrorist's eyes. The psychological motivations of individuals in terrorist groups may be such that our efforts to threaten them simply strengthen their resolve. Similarly, their sense of group identity and commitment make it highly unlikely they will give up the tactic so long as the cause, and more importantly the group, exists. To give up terrorism for them is to sacrifice their very reason for being.⁵⁶

State sponsors of terrorism must also understand and accept the credibility of the threat, and share the view of retaliation's consequences and cost. Otherwise deterrence will not work. Because states do not rely on the terrorist groups for their existence, and since they have greater stakes in the international community, one might expect that they might more easily be affected than the terrorists. If the deterrent threat is credible up to and including the possibility of war, the sponsor/supporting states have far more to lose -- so long as their leaders understand that. The threat of nuclear retaliation may serve as a deterrent for sponsors considering providing weapons of mass destruction technology to terrorists,⁵⁷ but this is an uncertain dynamic of extended deterrence. The rationality of some state leaders who support terrorism may also be closer to that of the terrorists than that of retaliating states' leaders.

One additional consideration is the likelihood that sponsor/supporter states may simply be learning how to better hide their links to terrorists. The aftermath of U.S. retaliation in both Libya and with threats toward Iran have demonstrated this.⁵⁸ The complexity of the contemporary world-wide economy, the openness of borders, and the ease of international travel

make this more possible. In addition, as Western strengths and weaknesses are better known, terrorists and their helpmates are adapting. For example, almost all interested parties can find information on the Internet regarding relative locations and general capabilities of satellite imaging platforms.

The states who support terrorism understand well many of the sources of intelligence, and equally know the importance of linkage to a successful retaliatory policy. Osama Bin Laden, widely reported to finance terrorist activities in the Middle East, and perhaps linked to incidents in Saudi Arabia, presents a good example of the difficulties in tracking and targeting terrorist support today.⁵⁹ Shadowy financial ties to various countries and groups, and his frequent movements make it hard to discern if Bin Laden is directly supporting terrorist groups, and if he is linked to other terrorist supporters.

Viability of retaliation. The dynamics of deterrence itself are problematic, and the number of examples by which we can evaluate the effects of retaliation are few. At the theoretical level, retaliation does not appear to be a reliable enhancement to deterrence of terrorism. Furthermore, the motivations for the choice of the terrorist tactic make deterrence of the terrorists themselves unlikely. The deterrence of states sponsoring or supporting terrorism is highly dependent on many complex factors, and is also not easily predictable. Even if the viability of retaliation as a deterrent could be assured, however, the question of its risk must be considered.

Risks of retaliation. Retaliation is a risky option. As mentioned above, the moral and legal considerations may affect the way it will be viewed, not only by the world community, but also by the retaliating state's own public. Beyond these considerations, and the chances that it may

not serve as an effective deterrent, retaliation may fail even more catastrophically.

While the military may have the capacity to retaliate, protecting forces in these operations is most difficult. Counterterrorism strikes are in-extremis operations where mobility, timing, logistics, and human capabilities are all stretched to the maximum extent. The failure of retaliatory operations, unless they are entirely covert and undiscovered, can be more spectacular than their success.

Retaliation invites the escalation of violence. The psychological makeup of many of those using the terrorist tactic are such that they will react violently. The inherent inability of the terrorist or his sponsor to directly confront the defending state in a symmetric (conventional) conflict virtually ensures they will react with more terrorism.⁶⁰ The Israeli examples of retaliation over the past 30 years aptly illustrate the cycle of ever-increasing violence and terror that retaliation perpetuates.⁶¹ Recent newspaper reports indicate that the debate in Israel continues over retaliation as a counter-terror policy. As Israeli leaders consider the prospects of taking on Iran as a terrorist sponsor, the dangers of escalation, and the possibilities of weapons of mass destruction may in fact deter Israel itself from a confrontation.⁶²

In summary, military retaliation does not appear to be a reliably effective option to deter terrorism. Furthermore, the potential success of retaliation, even under conditions which would be optimal for deterrence, may not outweigh its considerable risks. The option of using military force -- in effect terror itself -- to fight terrorism by others, is and should be a difficult choice.

(6580 words)

1. Bremer, L. Paul III, "New Faces of Terrorism," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 88.
2. Ottaway, David, "U.S. Considers Slugging it Out With International Terrorism," *Washington Post*, October 17, 1996, sec A, p.25.
3. Art, Robert J., "American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force," *Security Studies* 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 8.
4. Sederberg, Peter C., *Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric, and Reality* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 40-42. This author dissects much of the definition problem, and distills these two key aspects of terrorism in what I found to be the clearest, and most value-free analysis of the root of the terrorist tactic.
5. Hanle, Donald, *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare* (Washington, Pergamon-Brassey, 1989), 106. In his discussion of the abnormality of terrorism, this author makes clear that abnormality is a transitory and normative term, based on the accepted mores of the victimized group -- thus the argument that terrorism is often defined "in the eye of the beholder."
6. Wheeler, Everett L., "Terrorism and Military Theory: An Historical Perspective," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 17-21.
7. See Long, Kenneth, "Understanding and Teaching the Semantics of Terrorism: An Alternative Perspective," *Perspectives on Political Science* 19, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 203-207. Here Long argues that commonly used definitions are imprecise and semantically-flawed, loaded with the value judgements of their proponents. He uses as an example the Internal Revenue Service, which, because it coerces compliance by threats of seizures, arrests, etc., could be considered a terrorist organization under some definitions.
8. Goldberg, Joseph, "Understanding the Dimensions of Terrorism," *Perspectives on Political Science* 20, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 78-88, gives an alternative view, insisting that the moral dimension, and the intent of the violence is critical to defining terrorism.
9. Terrorism's many possible objectives include: direct results (assassination), publicity/agenda-setting, demonstration of resolve and power, constituency-building, degradation of enemy legitimacy and support, material gain (guns, money, release of prisoners, etc.), increasing costs for the enemy, reaction-provocation, revenge, coercion and intimidation of supporters/members, and repression of the public. Usually there are multiple objectives for any given act. Similar acts by the same, or different terrorists may have very dissimilar objectives. This is further argument to consider terrorism as a tactic, rather than an end in itself. Also see O'Neill, Bard E., *Insurgency & Terrorism* (Washington, Brassey's, c.1990), 25, and Jenkins, Brian, "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," *Survival* (Jul/Aug 1975): 158-160.
10. O'Brien, William V., "Terrorism -- What Should We Do?," section in a **This World** symposium, no. 12 (Fall 1985), *USAF Current News Special Edition* (7 Jan 86): 6.
11. United States law prohibits the use of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to enforce civil law. This law, the *Posse Comitatus Act* of 1878 (later amended), has been interpreted to limit the use of the military in domestic counterterrorism efforts.
12. Liddell Hart, B. H., *Strategy*, 2d ed. (NY, Meridian Books, 1991), 321-329. Hart describes the strategy of limited aim, whereby a fighter bides his time while awaiting a change in the overall balance of forces (such as a period in which the terrorist group builds consensus and popular support for a guerilla or even conventional war). In the strategy of limited aim, the terrorist "drains the enemy's force, weakening him by pricks instead of risking blows." Liddell Hart goes on to illustrate the psychological effects of indirect attacks (which, it is argued in this paper, are a critical aspect of terrorism).

13. Economy of Force is one of the basic "Principles of War" accepted by the U.S. military. Economy of Force is the concept that wherever possible, the war maker should gain maximum advantage from as little effort as possible -- the idea of conservation combined with efficiency. See U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, (June 1993), 2-5. See also Liddell Hart, 323-324, where he postulates the "perfect economy of force," an ideal strategy to produce a decision without any serious fighting.
14. Wheeler, 23.
15. The literature is replete with references to this model which defines the nature of terrorism. One of the key characteristics of the terrorist tactic is that the violence is intended to affect an audience beyond its immediate victim, creating fear, and causing some reaction either within that audience itself, or often within some policy-making group for whom the audience is a constituency. See Hanle, 115, and Sloan, Stephen, "Terrorism: How Vulnerable is the United States," *Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front*, Stephen C. Pelletiere, Ed., (Washington, Strategic Studies Institute, May 1995), 2.
16. Sederberg, devotes an entire chapter to this; his conclusion is that terrorism is not solely a tactic of weakness.
17. Hutchinson, Martha Crenshaw, "Transnational Terrorism and World Politics," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1, no.2 (Winter 1975): 109. See also O'Neill, 24-25, 36, and 45-47.
18. Crenshaw, Martha, "How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism," in *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, Lawrence Howard, Ed. (New York, Praeger, 1992), 72.
19. Liddell Hart, 369.
20. Buckelew, Alvin H., *Terrorism and the American Response* (San Raphael, CA., Mira Academy Press, c.1984), 22-23.
21. Post, Jerrold M., "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior As a Product of Psychological Forces," *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Walter Reich, Ed. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27. The author suggests that many terrorists may have an injured self concept, which results in their externalizing problems -- a "me vs them" mentality whereby they project problems on those outside. The psychological terms for this are externalization and splitting.
22. Ibid., 31-37, and also Crenshaw, "How Terrorists Think," 75. Also see Post, Jerrold M., "Rewarding Fire With Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics," *Terrorism* 10, no.1 (1987): 25-26, and 30-33.
23. Gurr, Ted Robert, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970), 359.
24. Crenshaw, Martha, "The logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, Walter Reich, Ed. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990), 10-14.
25. Johnson, Paul, "The Cancer of Terrorism," *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ed. (New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1986), 37.
26. Livingstone, Neil C., "Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption, and Retribution," *Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism*, N. Livingstone and T. Arnold, Eds. (Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath and Co., 1986), 119.
27. NSDD 138 quoted by Livingstone, Neil C., "Proactive Responses to Terrorism," 112. Here the author cites the three major themes of NSDD 138 as: 1) States that use or support terrorism cannot do so without facing consequences; 2) The United States will use *all* available channels to dissuade terrorism's use; and 3) When all else fails, the United States has the *right to defend itself* [emphasis added].

28. Cooper, Michael. "Addressing International Terrorism." *International Relations Journal* (Fall 1994): 6, Online. Internet (<http://psirus.sfsu.edu/IntRel/IRJournal/fa94/cooper.html>).
29. The May 1995 *Defense Planning Guidance* states, "Planning guidance for Other Missions: In addition as long as terrorist groups continue to target American citizens and interests, the U.S. will need to have specialized units available to defeat such groups. From time to time, the nation might also find it necessary to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by governments that support them."
30. Morgan, Patrick M., *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 2d ed. (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, c. 1983), 11.
31. Schelling, Thomas, *The Strategy of Conflict* (NY, Oxford University Press, 1963), 9 and 18.
32. See Huth, Paul K., *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, CN, Yale University Press, c.1988), 4.
33. Schelling, 4-5. Also, for how this may apply to terrorism, see Crenshaw, "Transnational Terrorism and World Politics," 120.
34. Ibid., 17. See also Kissinger, Henry, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects for American Foreign Policy*, (NY, Harper, 1961), 40-41, and Green, Phillip, *Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence* (Cleveland, Ohio State University Press, c.1966), 158-159.
35. See Morgan, 24 for a short synopsis. The original sources are: Brodie, Bernard, *War and Politics* (NY, Macmillan, 1973), 430-431; Kaufman, William, *The Requirements of Deterrence*, Center of International Studies Memorandum No. 7 (Princeton, 1954), 7; and Snyder, Glenn, "Deterrence and Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2: 163-178.
36. See Lebow, Richard N. and Janice Gross Stein, Eds., *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), Lebow and Stein, Eds., "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336-369. Also see Jervis, Robert, "Deterrence and Perception," *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader*, Steven Miller, Ed. (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984). In a broad historical study of 20 cases over 2500 years of history, Naroll, Raoul, Vern L. Bullough, and Frada Naroll, *Military Deterrence in History: A Pilot Cross-Historical Survey* (Albany, State University of NY Press, 1974), found that there was no general correlation to support that military preparedness tends to deter war.
37. Lieberman, Elli, *Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?*, McNair Paper 45 (Washington, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 63-65.
38. Morgan, 164.
39. Zimmerman, Tim, "The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive Diplomacy?," *Survival* (May-Jun 87): 195.
40. Livingstone, Steven, *The Terrorism Spectacle* (San Francisco, Westview Press, c.1994), 40.
41. *Dayton Daily News*, April 15, 1986, 3, and *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1986, op ed page.
42. See Crelinsten, Ronald D. and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-five Year Balance Sheet," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 316; and Stork, Joe, "Mad Dogs and Presidents," *Middle East Report* (May-Jun 1986):8, for a representation of the two views.
43. Ibid., 316. Also see Voigt, Bradley D., "Responses to Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism (1980-1994), A Comparative Analysis," thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994, 31 and 68.

44. Simon, Jeffrey D. *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience With Terrorism* (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1994), 199.
45. See Bremer, L. Paul III, "Countering Terrorism: U.S. Policy in the 1980's and 1990's," *Terrorism* 11, no. 6 (1988): 531-538; Netanyahu, Benjamin, *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism* (N.Y. Farrar, Straus, Giroux, c.1995), 73 and 133-134; Crelinsten, 317-319; and Voigt, 31-35. Bremer and Netanyahu are more positive on immediate effects, while Crelinsten and Voigt present the view that the retaliation led to significant escalation in many subsequent attacks, culminating with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. Bremer goes on, after citing the immediate downturn in Libyan direct involvement, to explain that actual ties between Libya and the Abu Nidal Organization strengthened after the raid. In addition, there were numerous other terrorist groups that claimed subsequent attacks as being in revenge for the April '86 U.S. action.
46. Simon, 200.
47. The specific examples of continued and escalating terrorist violence following the raid are many: Libyan boats firing on U.S. installations; killing of a U.S. and several British hostages in Lebanon; incidents in Sudan, Israel, Yemen, Mexico, Britain, Pakistan, and Tunisia. See Crelinsten, Voigt, Bremer, and Simon. Also see Jenkins, Brian, "Defense Against Terrorism," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 5 (1986): 773-786.
48. Simon, 200.
49. Wooster, Robert, *The Military and U.S. Indian Policy 1865-1903* (Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, c.1988), 91-95 and 127-136. Also see Bourke, John G., *On the Border With Crook* (Lincoln, NE, University of Nebraska Press, 1971). In this account of the Plains Indian Wars written by an Army Captain in 1891, the author describes the intent of Army raids to subdue and deter the Indians from further attacks, to deter other tribes from resistance, and to reinforce the confidence of the white public. Statements of Army officers indicate that the use of indiscriminate force against Indian women and children, while not a policy dictated by Washington, was a conscious tactical decision made by leaders in the field with the intent to deter future Indian attacks.
50. Ibid.
51. O'Neill, Bard E., *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political Military Analysis* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978), 46-85.
54. Ibid.
55. See Crelinsten, 319; Simon, "Misunderstanding Terrorism," 31; and Alon, Hanon, "Can Terrorism be Deterred? Some Thoughts and Doubts," *Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism*, Anat Kurz, Ed. (N.Y., Praeger, 1987), 130-131.
56. Livingstone, "Proactive Responses...", 219.
57. Simon, Jeffrey D., "Misunderstanding Terrorism," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1987): 34.
58. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic...", 38. Also see Saper, Bernard, "On Learning Terrorism," *Terrorism* 11, no. 1 (1988): 16-22, for a discussion on terror tactics as learned behavior. Saper explains how the attention derived from terrorist events can be reinforcing for the individuals involved.
59. Laqueur, Walter, "Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game," *Foreign Affairs* (Sep/Oct 96), Online, Internet, (<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/feature.html>), 4-5.
60. Ibid., 3. Also see Alon, 130-131.

61. Hanley, Charles J., "Questions Unanswered in S. Arabia," Associated Press report (Mar 1, 97), Online, Internet, (AOLNewsProfiles@aol.net).
62. Voigt, 14. See also Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1987), 311-321.
63. Laqueur, Walter, "The Futility of Terrorism," *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Charles W. Kegley, Ed. (NY, St Martin's Press, c.1990), 211-212.
64. FBIS translation from Tel Aviv Ma'Ariv, August 16, 1996 (FBIS-TOT-96-023-L), FBIS translation from Tel Aviv Yedi'ot Aharonot, November 4, 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-2180). Also see Alon, 130-131.

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